

A/B Testing in Networks with Adversarial Members


MLG Workshop 2017 **Kaleigh Clary** and David Jensen University of Massachusetts Amherst August 14, 2017





A/B Testing





A/B Testing













violation of SUTVA

A/B Testing in Networks: Graph Cluster Randomization




J. Ugander, B. Karrer, L. Backstrom, and J. Kleinberg. Graph cluster randomization: Network exposure to multiple universes. SIGKDD 2013

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


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
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
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Avatar vector images designed by Freepik



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
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Adversaries

- Participants in the experiment who would like to influence the estimate of interest, e.g. ATE
 - Increasing or decreasing the estimate of interest
 - Introducing random behavior to the estimate

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




Adversaries


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Motivations for Adversaries

- Competition
- Noncompliance
- Privacy






Avatar vector image designed by Freepik Robot vector images designed by Vecteezy

Motivations for Adversaries

- Competition
- Noncompliance
- Privacy





Assume all adversaries have the same behavior model

Avatar vector image designed by Freepik Robot vector images designed by Vecteezy

ATE Estimation in Networks

 Assume outcome is a linear additive function of treatment (Gui et al, 2015)

$$Y_i(Z) = \alpha + \beta z_i + \gamma A_i^T Z + \eta A_i^T Y / D_{ii}$$

- β : individual treatment effect γ : peer treatment effect
- $\dot{\eta}$: peer outcome effect
- Estimate treatment effect from data

$$g(z_i, \sigma_i) = \alpha + \beta z_i + \gamma \sigma_i$$

$$z_i: \text{ treatment assignment} \\ \sigma_i: \text{ treatment exposure}$$

$$A\hat{T}E=\hat{\beta}+\hat{\gamma}$$

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
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Adversary Placement

(1) Random assignment over the graph


(2) Targeted adversary placement

 When adversaries form a dominating set over the graph, every vertex contains at least one adversary in their set of neighbors



Adversary Influence

 Adversary influence measures the sum of relative effects of a node on its neighbors' outcomes



$$\omega_i = D^{-1} A \mathbb{I}_i^N$$


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Bias in ATE Induced by Adversaries


• Adversaries bias ATE estimates through:

(1) The value of their outcome

(2) The effect of their outcome on their neighbors' outcome

- strength depends on true network effect

$$A\hat{T}E_{R_Y} = \sum_{j \in A_r} \frac{1}{d_j} (Y_r - \bar{Y}_{A_j \setminus r})$$




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


$$A\hat{T}E_{R_Y} = \sum_{j \in A_r} \frac{1}{d_j} (Y_r - \bar{Y}_{A_j \setminus r})$$

$$\approx \omega_r (Y_r - \bar{Y}_{A_{2_r}})$$

Approximate bias from effect of adversary outcome using *influence, ω*

Experimental Results



$$Y_{i,t} = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 z_i + \lambda_2 \frac{A_i Y_{t-1}}{D_{i,i}} + U_{i,t}$$

Summary

- Derived expressions for the bias induced by adversary behavior
- Empirically demonstrated a vulnerability in network A/B testing to manipulation of ATE estimates from exploitation of peer effects
- Examined the difference between random and targeted placement of adversaries in the network
- *Future work*: Characterize the relationship between adversary detection and strength of adversarial response

Thank you